

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

An analysis of current international events



1918-1949

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION • INCORPORATED • 22 EAST 38TH STREET • NEW YORK 16, N. Y.

VOL. XXVIII No. 20

FEBRUARY 25, 1949

Military Factors Play Major Part In Atlantic Pact

WASHINGTON—The chief purpose of the North Atlantic pact now being negotiated in Washington is to make possible the rearmament of Western Europe and the creation of machinery for continuous military planning between the United States and the other signatories. The emphasis which public debate has given to the question whether the pact ultimately implies a declaration of war has obscured its real character. War is a remote issue, but rearmament is an immediate question. The pact is fundamentally a military proposal. For that reason the National Security Council, essentially a military body, has controlled formulation of policy guiding the American negotiators in their conversations about the treaty with the ambassadors of Canada, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The Secretary of State represents the only civilian agency which is a member of the Council. The other representatives are the Secretaries of Defense, Navy, Army, and Air Force, and the chairman of the National Resources Security Board.

Military Influence on Pact

The political consequences of the basic military consideration are far-reaching. The formal duty of the National Security Council is to advise the President. Actually, it makes foreign policy whenever military matters are directly or potentially involved. The Council worked out the formula of "no pact, no arms"—meaning that only partners in the treaty would have first call on military supplies on credit from the United States. This prompted Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard Lange to come to Washington

to inquire about the benefits Norway, which needs military supplies, would obtain on signing the treaty. The Council's formula hastened the breakdown last month of the Norwegian-Swedish-Danish negotiations for a Scandinavian pact. While some advisers to Defense Secretary James V. Forrestal criticize the treaty as an inadequate device, the prevailing military opinion is that the most effective rearmament program would be based on a scheme for close co-operation among all the powers receiving arms. According to that opinion, the treaty would open the way to co-operation.

Charles Bohlen, counselor of the State Department, clearly brought out the purpose of the treaty in an address to the New York State Bar Association on January 28 when he said: "Western European countries . . . cannot now bear the double burden of both recovery and rearmament. . . . Therefore, the United States proposes to provide the military supplies and equipment, above the quantities the other countries can supply themselves, in order to put teeth in the pact." It is informally reported here that Western Europe can muster nine fully equipped divisions, in contrast to the twenty which is probably the minimum necessary to hold the Atlantic front in the opening days of any new major war. According to Counselor Bohlen, "each of the countries will be expected to meet its own needs to the greatest possible extent and to contribute what it can to the common cause," but so far the Europeans who have shown an interest in the Atlantic pact hesitate to stress armaments in their budgets.

The British government announced on February 15 that it planned to spend £654,500,000 (\$2,618,000,000) on army, navy, and air force during the coming year. While this exceeds the current budget by £107,500,000, the increase reflects higher pay in the services and higher costs for material rather than real growth in the size and strength of the military force. A public debate about the size of the military establishment is taking place in Norway. The Oslo newspaper *Aftenposten* on February 17 suggested that the government discuss with the Storting (parliament) the question of increasing the establishment. "It is necessary that no one can rightly say of us that we permitted others to carry the burdens for us which we could have carried for ourselves," the paper said. Actually two countries which are not prospective signers of the Atlantic pact, Sweden and Spain, are by some considerations the strongest military powers on the European continent west of the Soviet zone of influence.

Amount for Arms?

The interest in rearmament makes it inevitable that representatives of the Military Establishment take a leading part in the negotiation of the Atlantic pact. They control the decisions about the quantities of weapons to be procured for dispatch abroad, provided Congress agrees, and they have an obvious professional claim to membership on international military planning commissions. Yet the Administration finds it tactically advantageous for the present to let the State Department assume public responsibility for the

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creation of policy underlying the treaty negotiations, because this diverts congressional attention from the question of how much material the United States should send abroad. By focusing attention on the supply problem now the Administration would subject the treaty issue to complicated political debate about a vexing domestic subject—the size of the Federal budget for fiscal year 1950. The Capitol is looking for ways to economize. Already some Democratic members of the Senate, including the influential Walter F. George of Georgia, have asked whether Congress

should reduce the Administration's request of \$5,580,000,000 for the second year of the European Recovery Program.

Secretary Forrestal in his annual report of December 28, and President Truman in his Budget Message of January 10, implied that the Administration at a fitting time would ask Congress for legislation authorizing the distribution of weapons. Such a bill would supplement the Atlantic pact, but neither the President nor Mr. Forrestal has named the sum the Administration considers necessary for rearmament abroad. Officials in-

formally have mentioned \$2,000,000,000 for the first year, but it may take \$5,000,000,000 to satisfy the elementary military needs of Western Europe. The State Department on December 29 appointed Ernest A. Gross, then its legal adviser, now nominated as Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, to collaborate with the Military Establishment and the Economic Cooperation Administration in the preparation of legislation for military assistance. The Atlantic pact itself, however, will not provide for the distribution of arms.

BLAIR BOLLES

Perspective Needed In Appraising World Crisis

In a press conference of February 9 Secretary of State Dean Acheson, discussing the prospects of European union, reminded his listeners that Europe should not be thought of as if it were the United States, and that its problems were rooted in 2,000 years of history. Sound and lasting progress, he said, must come out of the feelings, traditions and desires of the Europeans themselves. He thus introduced a note that has often been conspicuously lacking both in official pronouncements and in commentators' analyses—the note of historic perspective.

How Can History Help?

In the absence of such perspective, every international development assumes the proportions of an unforeseen catastrophe wholly disconnected from what may have gone before or may come after in the stream of human history. Under such circumstances the tendency develops to deal with each crisis separately, as it arises, with the result that foreign policy, formulated piecemeal, tends to become, in the words of Gilbert and Sullivan, "a thing of shreds and patches." All Western nations, moreover, are inclined to view Europe, or Europe plus North America, as the center of the universe, with the rest of the globe seen as a shadowy periphery, sometimes useful, more often disturbing—an inclination that could prove disastrous at a time when the alleged periphery seeks to assume the center of the world stage. Never has it been so important for all of us in this country to study history (underpinned, of course, by geography) not only from the point of view of the Western world, but also from the vantage point of other peoples—of the Russians, the Indians, the Chinese, the Latin Americans—whose perspectives are often very different from our own.

Not that history should be resorted to as a narcotic offering a pleasant escape from harsh reality. Neither should it be invoked as a final resolution of all problems, thus freeing those of us who live today from all responsibility for the moulding of contemporary events on the plea that we are caught up in some "wave of the future." Nor is it morally courageous to take refuge in the blandly tolerant adage that "to understand all is to forgive all"—for while it is essential to understand as much as possible, it is not right to condone cruelty and injustice, whatever their source. Where history does help is in situating events so that they may be more or less correctly evaluated and compared, and so that some attempt can be made, with at least approximate accuracy, to foresee future developments, and thus ascertain which of any given number of alternative policies is best calculated to steer the course of events in the direction regarded as desirable.

It is difficult for Western nations to appraise the rest of the world, partly at least because the West had come to believe that the state of affairs which had developed before 1914 would somehow or other be a terminal stage in history, not subject to further change. As Professor Toynbee has said, "we can see now . . . that the relative peace and prosperity of the Western world in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which we took for granted in our childhood, and which our predecessors likewise took for granted in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was not a stable or normal condition but only a lull between two bouts of trouble." While we now grasp this, although often rather dimly, we still tend to think that the rest of the world does and must reason exactly like the peoples of the West.

For example, Mr. Acheson, in his press conference of January 26, rightly said that "the American view of life is one which flows directly from the Renaissance," referring to "the other theory" as a view which goes back to the period before the Renaissance. How large an area of the world, however, had come within the range of the Renaissance influence? For that matter, how large a segment of the world had been affected by the other great forces that shaped Western civilization—the Roman Empire, feudalism, Roman Catholicism, the Reformation, the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution? Even nations which had felt the impact of some, if not all, these forces, and seemed to be part of Western civilization, like Germany, suddenly appeared alien to the West when seen in the harsh glare of Nazi doctrines and practices.

What Can West Expect?

In view of such great differences in historical development, is it realistic to expect peoples outside the relatively narrow Western orbit to have the same philosophy of life, customs, attitudes, practices as those which we have acquired—not, it must be recalled, without great struggle, as the history of the English people bears witness? The French political scientist André Siegfried recently said in the *Figaro* that it has been unrealistic for the United States to insist on the establishment of democratic institutions in the countries of Eastern Europe. Is it unrealistic also to expect them in China, in Latin America? Is it realistic to believe that a few years of Western occupation in Japan and Germany will fundamentally alter the entrenched habits of thought and the institutions of the Japanese and the Germans? Turning

the tables, is it realistic for the Soviet government, which has found it at least as difficult to understand the West as the West has found it to understand the "peripheral" peoples, to assume that even a measure of economic maladjustment in the United States would result in the social and economic changes which Soviet theorists, on the basis of Karl Marx's analysis of English and German capitalism of the nineteenth century, persist in believing must be the automatic result of capitalist economic processes?

Let us suppose, however, that pressure by the Western world might cause internal upheavals in Russia and in the countries of Eastern Europe, and that local populations would decide sooner or later without the aid of war, "to kick the scoundrels out." What then would be the alternative? To go back to governments that in several instances were reactionary by Western standards—decidedly not in harmony with the view of life produced by the Renaissance—and had shown little or no concern for the masses of the population whose miseries and frustrations fed the fires of com-

munism? It would seem difficult for the Western world to applaud such a development. There remains the alternative of encouraging the emergence of sufficiently strong middle groups capable of serving as a dike against extremism from both Right and Left—as in England, most notably, and also in France and Italy (although the Italians fear that unless they find outlets for at least two million emigrants they will not be able to hold the dike). But middle groups can emerge only if there are some prospects of greater literacy, better health and education, fuller participation by the population in political and economic life, and at least a modest improvement in standards of living, either as a result of industrialization or of modernization of agriculture and related domestic crafts. Yet in many countries even moderate reforms of this character would require structural changes in society which those who resist such changes describe as tantamount to revolution.

It is proper for the West to hope that changes will come about peacefully, without resort to violence—although the his-

tory of Western nations like England and France, now models of democracy, are filled with clashes between social groups and between church and state. But it is essential for the West, which has in its hands all the instruments of leadership—both those that can construct and those that can destroy—to understand that the explosions which today startle and shock us might have been averted had remedial measures been taken in time.

Most of the retarded peoples are keenly interested in acquiring American techniques, but they want to adapt these techniques to their own circumstances which, because of differences in historical development, often differ materially from those of the West. The modern historian can offer valuable aid in analyzing the causes and effects of such differences, instead of merely seeking to conform with superficial popular reactions to the world-crisis. He might heed the advice of Lord Acton, who said: "Modern history touches us so nearly, it is so deep a question of life and death, that we are bound to find our own way through it, and to owe our insight to ourselves."

VERA M. DEAN

U.N. Pioneers In Aid To Underdeveloped Countries

President Truman's "point four" program of aid to underdeveloped countries which potentially may exceed in scope the European Recovery Program is expected to be implemented through the United Nations and private agencies rather than direct financing by Washington. Specific proposals on this subject are being submitted to the UN Economic and Social Council, now in session at Lake Success, by Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State.

UN Technical Aid

In its initial phase the United States will probably contribute from \$500,000 to \$1,000,000, while urging the other members of the UN to participate in joint planning on a global scale. Once the framework of aid has been established, it is hoped the way will be opened for the investment of private capital in specific projects on a basis that will be mutually satisfactory to all parties concerned.

Clearance for UN initiative in this field has already been obtained as the UN General Assembly meeting in Paris last November and December adopted four resolutions authorizing ECOSOC to undertake responsibility for formulating a program to make technical aid available to underdeveloped countries.

Among the 56 items on the agenda of the current session of the ECOSOC is a resolution authorizing members of the UN to ask for international teams of experts, aid in training personnel, equipment and supplies, international seminars, and the exchange of technical information. For these purposes the Assembly approved an expenditure of \$288,000. As compared with the sums involved in the Marshall plan, this outlay is minute. Nevertheless, it represents an approach of great potentiality, and one which, given substantial support, might prove of major value.

Already, for example, technical missions have gone to a number of countries to give advice on all sorts of local problems. Most recently a team of experts from the UN and specialized agencies went to Haiti to study the problems of economic development in "agriculture, industry and related activities" and the associated problems of improving health and education, and to formulate concrete proposals to "promote the economic development of the country."

During 1946 an FAO mission charged with broad responsibilities in the field of agriculture went to Greece where it vis-

ited all areas of the country. The group included 12 experts on various subjects ranging from agriculture, fisheries and rural sociology to power and home economics. It produced a series of 89 recommendations for long-term development, beginning with emergency measures and proceeding to such matters as extensive irrigation and hydroelectric development, modernization of agriculture, fisheries improvement, expansion of research and education, promotion of the co-operative movement, stimulus to new industries and fiscal and civil service reforms.

Teams of Experts

A somewhat smaller UN mission was sent to Poland in 1947, and recently a team has gone to Siam to study development and control of water supplies—with particular reference to a major project for the Bangkok plain—as well as a number of other problems. Some technicians are being maintained in China by the FAO to advise on livestock rehabilitation and disease control, production and use of farm implements, manufacture and use of fertilizers, crop production, and improved methods of flood control.

In the field of industrialization notable work is being done by the Economic Com-

mission for Asia and the Far East which has set up a working party charged with responsibility for examining questions of fuel and power, transport, fertilizers, basic materials, textiles, and heavy engineering industries. A similar commission has been set up for Latin America, and one is even now being planned by ECOSOC for the Middle East.

In addition to technical missions, the UN has begun to provide equipment and supplies—although so far on a limited scale—including medical materials, laboratory and teaching equipment, seed, and urgently needed publications.

Economic Independence

As the nonindustrialized countries begin to plan for expansion of their own economies, however, it appears inevitable that conflicts of interest with international ramifications will become more acute. Egypt, for example, has gone ahead with plans for industrialization which include development of the estimated reserve of 300 million tons of hematite iron ore in the Aswan district, exploitation of phosphates and manganese reserves, the domestic refining of oil now exported in crude form, and the processing of Egypt's chief crop, cotton, of which three-quarters now goes abroad for manufacture.

These programs, however, will require considerable imports of machinery and technicians for which Egypt does not have adequate foreign exchange, especially dollars. At the same time the desire of Egypt to refine locally the oil needed for domestic consumption as well as for export conflicts with the interests of the Standard Oil Company of Egypt, an affiliate of Standard Oil of New Jersey which, after twelve years in the country and an investment of about \$12.5 million, announced on February 20 its intention to suspend operations pending clarification of a recent Egyptian law governing natural resources. It appears clear that the future international orientation and domestic policies of countries such as Egypt will depend to a large extent on how Washington, acting independently or through the UN, and American private corporations, respond to the aspirations

News in the Making

The conclusion of the *International Wheat Conference*, which has been meeting in Washington since January 25, will disclose whether the U.S.S.R. and the Western nations can agree on a fundamental economic problem of interest to them all. Soviet representatives to the conference have offered to supply 20 per cent of the wheat import requirements of the participating nations at whatever price the meeting agrees to fix, probably \$2 a bushel. . . . While the Russian proposal, contrary to some reports from Europe, played no part whatever in the wheat price decline in the United States, it was a factor in the decision of Argentina, a major wheat exporter with a large European market, to withdraw from the conference on February 18. Another factor was the \$2 price, which Argentina refused to accept on the ground that this figure is not sufficient to cover the price (reportedly \$1.85 a bushel) that the Argentine Trade Promotion Institute is now paying producers. . . . After months of talk, twenty-four European nations of both East and West and the United States agreed at a UN Economic Commission for Europe meeting in Geneva on February 19 to reduce to practical terms the possibilities of *expanded trade between Eastern and Western Europe* through an exchange of "shopping-lists" which would indicate what countries in the two regions can offer for sale. . . . A basic consideration in the diplomatic contest between the United States and the U.S.S.R. for a defense treaty relationship with Norway is the strategic usefulness of the *Spitsbergen Islands* (Svalbard). From these islands airplanes could command a large stretch of the Arctic region, including a portion of the Great Circle shipping lanes in the Atlantic Ocean and the sea route to Murmansk and Petsamo in the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union operates coal mines on Spitsbergen under a concession granted to a Russian company before the revolution of nonindustrialized peoples not only for political independence but also for economic development.

FRED W. RIGGS

Branch & Affiliate Meetings

*CLEVELAND, February 28, *Czechoslovakia's New Role in Europe*, Gen. Jaroslav Hasal

*HARTFORD, February 28, *Will the U.N. Maintain Peace?* Clark Eichelberger, George C. Holt, Herbert Brucker

BETHLEHEM, March 3, *An Appraisal of U.N. Accomplishments and Failures*, Fred W. Riggs

PHILADELPHIA, March 4, *Japan*, Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger

SPRINGFIELD, March 5, *The Expansion of Communism—Can it Be Stopped?*, Dr. Ethan Colton, Louis J. Alber

BUFFALO, March 7, *How Does American Policy Affect Democracy in Germany and Japan?*, Roger Baldwin

WORCESTER, March 10, *Germany Today and Tomorrow*, Carl J. Friedrich, Herbert Gezork

*Data taken from printed announcements.

of 1917, but Moscow has shown no political or military interest in the islands since the Norwegian parliament in 1946 declined to act on a Russian proposal that Norway and Russia together declare the defense of Spitsbergen was the joint concern of the two countries. The United States is a signatory of the treaty of February 9, 1920, which recognizes the sovereignty of Norway in Spitsbergen and forbids the establishment of military bases there. . . . Israel's first constituent assembly—named *Knesset* as was the Jewish assembly of 400 B.C. after the Babylonian exile—convened in Jerusalem February 14, elected Dr. Chaim Weizmann as President, and adopted an interim constitution. Creation of a cabinet under David Ben-Gurion and the drafting of a permanent constitution was expected to follow at meetings in Tel Aviv. . . . Meanwhile, *Egyptian-Israeli armistice* negotiations produced a draft agreement which was referred to Cairo, and the first exchange of prisoners captured in the Israeli-Arab war was begun with Trans-Jordan—both hopeful developments toward peace in the Middle East.

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN. Vol. XXVIII, No. 20, FEBRUARY 25, 1949. Published weekly from September through May inclusive and biweekly during June, July and August by the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated. National Headquarters, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y. BROOKS EMERY, President; HELEN M. DAGGETT, Secretary; VERA MICHELES DEAN, Editor; WILLIAM W. WADE, Associate Editor. Re-entered as second-class matter June 4, 1948, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Four Dollars a Year. Please allow at least one month for change of address on membership publications.

F. P. A. Membership (which includes the Bulletin), Six Dollars a Year.

Produced under union conditions and composed and printed by union labor.